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Altruism, Cooperation, and Efficiency: 
Agricultural Production in Polygynous Households
* 
 
Altruism among family members can, in some cases, inhibit cooperation by increasing the 
utility that players expect to receive in a non-cooperative equilibrium. To test this, we 
examine agricultural productivity in polygynous households in West Africa. We find that 
cooperation is greater – production is more efficient – among co-wives than among husbands 
and wives because co-wives are less altruistic towards each other. The results are not driven 
by scale effects or self-selection into polygyny. Nor can they be explained by greater 
propensity for cooperation among women generally or by the household head acting as an 
enforcement mechanism for others’ cooperative agreements. 
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Altruism towards others is typically thought to facilitate cooperation, as the inter-dependence of 
utility functions helps to align incentives and reduce transaction costs. Consequently, we should 
be more likely to observe an efficient allocation of resources among parties who are altruistic 
towards each other – most obviously, family members (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001). Pareto 
efficiency has been confirmed in many studies (Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Chiappori, 
Fortin, and Lacroix, 2002; Bobonis, 2009), but a growing body of empirical evidence suggests 
that households fail to achieve efficiency in certain circumstances, particularly in the presence of 
transaction costs (Duflo and Udry, 2004; Rangel and Thomas, 2005; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; 
Dubois and Ligon, 2010). However, what is less clear from these studies are the factors that may 
be inhibiting cooperation. 
In this paper, we argue that altruism may, in fact, be the culprit. We consider a game 
involving three players with differing degrees of altruism towards each other. In this case, 
stronger altruism can actually inhibit cooperation by increasing the utility that is obtained in the 
non-cooperative equilibrium and, therefore, reducing both the gains to cooperation and the threat 
of punishment. The implications of the model are tested using data on monogamous and 
polygynous households in Burkina Faso. We control for plot characteristics and household-crop-
year fixed effects and examine the variation in yields due to the inefficient allocation of inputs 
across plots controlled by individuals within the same household, planting the same crop in the 
same year. We find that the difference in yields between husbands and wives is considerably 
smaller in polygynous households, whereas the difference in yields between household heads 
and other male cultivators is slightly larger. This suggests greater cooperation among co-wives 
than among husbands and wives, because wives’ productivity increases while the head’s  
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productivity declines relative to other cultivators. The results are not driven by scale effects or 
self-selection into polygyny, nor are they the result of stronger preferences (lower costs) for 
cooperative behavior among women or of the household head serving as an enforcement 
mechanism for others’ cooperative agreements, except under specific circumstances. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the socio-cultural 
context and household arrangements in Burkina Faso and presents the data used in the empirical 
analysis. Section 3 presents a game-theoretic model of interactions among members in 
polygynous households. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and presents the main results, 
along with several robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Burkinabé Households 
Intrahousehold dynamics in rural Burkina Faso are quite complex. Households cultivate several 
rain-fed, primarily subsistence crops on multiple plots, some of which are controlled by the 
household head and some by other household members. Although norms vary by ethnic group, 
married Burkinabé women often have access to private plots under their own control (Kevane 
and Gray, 1999)
1. Control over plots includes decision-making power over crop choice, quantity 
and timing of inputs, and ownership of plot output (Guyer, 1986; Udry, 1996). This access does 
not relieve women of their responsibility to contribute labor to household fields for joint 
production (Dey, 1997), which typically takes precedence over females’ work in their own fields 
(van Koppen, 1990). While it is usually assumed that rural household heads are responsible for 
providing staple foods and covering expenditures on medical care and school fees, females often 
have to supply their own millet or cover expenses in practice. A single household, may include 
multiple mother-child pairs (Thorson, 2002), but each husband/wife pair is viewed as a separate 
                                                            
1 Wives' plot locations and sizes are determined by the husband, and they may change each year. Conversely, private 
fields of other household males are usually more stable and allow the male to accumulate wealth to eventually break 
off to form his own household (Diallo and Nagy, 1986).  
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entity (Boye et al., 1991).
2 Wife-child pairs typically live in their own nuclear units, hearthholds, 
or buildings, and wives are responsible for primary caretaking activities for their own children.
3 
Co-wives occupy various positions of power in the household, with the first wife typically 
holding the most power of the co-wives. 
Much of the anthropological literature suggests that co-wife relationships within 
polygynous households are characterized by conflict. Jankowiak, Sudakov and Wilreker (2005) 
find this to be true in almost all of the 69 polygynous cultures they reviewed. Despite this near-
universal trait, they note the tendency for co-wives to cooperate to achieve pragmatic goals, 
particularly if females are not as reliant on their husbands for material or emotional support. This 
scenario was suggested earlier by Becker (1981), who applied his Rotten Kid Theorem to 
suggest that cooperative behavior could occur in productive activities in polygamous households, 
while conflict might still occur over distribution. Given that women in Burkina Faso have been 
found to work significantly more hours per day than male household members (Saito, 1994), 
cooperation by co-wives could be an important method of managing demands on time and 
energy. Indeed, in rural areas of the Sahel, polygyny can serve to reduce a co-wife’s daily 
responsibilities by allowing women to engage in labor-sharing activities (Boye et al., 1991). 
Members of the same household and compound often exchange goods or services through 
involved agreements that are driven by local norms and customs (Saito, 1994). 
Kazianga and Klonner (2009) examine child survival in rural Mali using Demographic 
and Health Survey data and are unable to reject efficiency in child survival in monogamous 
                                                            
2 Compounds are the major social unit of organization, overseen by the male lineage head. Inside compounds are 
one or more households headed by males who have single and married male dependents and numerous hearthholds 
comprised of widows, wives, away migrants’ wives, daughters-in-law and single children (Thorson, 2002). 
3 Other female duties include retrieving water and wood, doing other domestic chores, caring for children, spinning 
cotton, and selling millet beer or food products (Diallo and Nagy, 1986). In general, each wife would prepare daily 
meals for her own children, with a rotation system among wives for preparing for the husband.  
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households and for children of senior wives in bigynous households. However, they find 
evidence of differential child survival by sex for junior wives and suggest that co-wife 
competition and the junior wife’s weaker bargaining position drive this inefficient result.  
Similarly, Mammen (2004) finds that some education-related outcomes differ (typically for the 
worse) for children of junior wives, although she cannot reject a version of the collective model 
when credit constraints are allowed. 
Data used in this paper are from the 1984-85 International Crops Research Institute for 
the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) Burkina Faso household survey, which covers 150 households 
in 6 villages across 3 provinces: Djibo, Yako, and Boromo (see Matlon, 1988 and Udry, 1996 for 
detailed descriptions of the data). Just over half (50.7 percent) of the households in our sample 
are polygynous, defined as the household head having two or more wives. Of these households, 
56 percent have two wives, 33 percent have three wives, and the remaining 11 percent report 4 or 
5 wives.
4 For household heads and other female non-wife cultivators, average yields are 
considerably lower in polygynous households compared to monogamous households, although 
average plot size is quite similar (Table 1). For wives and other males, yields are slightly higher 
and plots are somewhat larger in polygynous households. The percentage of plots planted with a 
given primary crop is quite different, with wives in polygynous households devoting a larger 
percentage of plots to millet and sorghum (staple crops) and a smaller percentage to okra and 
earthpeas/fonio (cash crops). Other cultivators also have a different distribution of crops across 
monogamous and polygynous households, although it does not differ as clearly between staple 
                                                            
4 We define polygyny by the number of wives listed in the household roster, because household heads were not 
asked to report the number of wives directly. Thus, if there are wives of the head living outside the household at the 
time of the survey, we may mistakenly count the household as monogamous. However, migration of wives appears 
to be quite rare in Burkina Faso. In our data, only 6 percent (17 out of 275) of economic migrants reported being a 
wife of the household head and, of these, the vast majority are listed in the household roster. Additionally, we 
construct both definitions of polygyny (reported versus observed number of wives) using the 1993 Demographic and 
Health Survey, with a difference of only 2 percentage points in the implied polygyny rate.  
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and cash crops. This suggests that polygynous households may utilize a different cropping 
strategy, although some of these differences may be driven by differences in agro-climatic zones 
that coincide with differences in polygyny rates within the ICRISAT sample.
5 
Several papers test for productive efficiency within the household, but none to date have 
focused on the distinction between monogamous and polygynous households. Using the 1981-83 
ICRISAT data, Udry (1996) finds that, among plots planted with the same crop in the same year 
within a given household, female-controlled plots achieve significantly lower yields than male-
controlled plots, even after controlling for plot characteristics, suggesting a lack of cooperation 
between husband and wife in the allocation of farm inputs. His analysis also reveals that 
households distribute inputs inefficiently: there is much less male labor on female-controlled 
plots, as well as lower manure usage. Households could increase output by approximately 6 
percent simply by reallocating inputs across plots. More recently, Rangel and Thomas (2005) 
have shown that differences in cropping patterns and fallow can explain husband-wife 
differences in yields. However, these are still endogenous production decisions; the finding that 
crop and fallow decisions are inefficient does not negate the possibility of non-cooperation in 
agricultural production. Additionally, Akresh (2008) shows that inefficiencies within the 
household are muted in the face of adverse shocks, perhaps because the gains to cooperation are 
larger when household production is closer to the subsistence level. A study by Kazianga and 
Wahhaj (2012) uses household-crop-year fixed effects and is able to reject Pareto efficiency in 
household production in Burkina Faso in 1993 and 1994. Kazianga and Wahhaj distinguish 
                                                            
5 The Djibo region is well-suited to millet and fonio but not white sorghum, and respondents in this region are 
predominantly Rimaibe with a low incidence of polygyny. The Yako region is well-suited to white sorghum, millet 
and cotton, and respondents in this region are predominantly Mossi with a high incidence of polygyny. The Boromo 
region is better suited to sorghum and maize than millet, and respondents are predominantly Dagari and Bwa, both 
with high incidences of polygyny (see Matlon, 1988).  
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between the household head, junior males, and females, but do not consider differences across 
monogamous and polygynous households. 
Allocative inefficiency in household production has been noted even despite evidence of 
technical efficiency in production across both genders (Quisumbing 1996). McPeak and Doss 
(2006) find evidence of non-cooperative behavior (and therefore potential inefficiency) in 
nomadic pastoralist households’ migration and milk marketing activities in northern Kenya. 
Peterman et al. (2010) find signs of lower productivity on female-controlled plots in Uganda and 
Nigeria, even after controlling for crop choice, agricultural inputs, socioeconomic background, 
and household fixed effects. They find, however, that gender productivity differentials vary by 
crops farmed, region, biophysical characteristics of the plot, and whether the gender variable was 
reported at the household or plot level. Exclusively in West Africa, Pareto inefficient outcomes 
have been observed in fallow times in Ghana (Goldstein and Udry 2008), although this result is 
primarily attributed to the roles of ambiguous property rights and individual political power. As 
households in West Africa are often organized with separate production spheres (Lundberg and 
Pollak 1993), observation of non-cooperative outcomes is not entirely surprising. 
3. Modeling Cooperation in Polygynous Households 
The notion that altruism can reduce efficiency was first formally suggested by Bernheim and 
Stark (1988). They describe two channels through which altruistic preferences may inhibit 
cooperation and the efficient allocation of resources. First, an altruist may take action to preempt 
exploitative behavior, in effect committing him/herself to an inefficient allocation so as to 
provide other household members with better incentives. Second, when altruism improves the 
static non-cooperative outcome, it also weakens the severity of punishments, making cooperative 
behavior more difficult to sustain. Our model goes in a slightly different direction, allowing for  
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three players within the same family to have differing degrees of altruism towards each other. 
The advantage of this formulation is that, when we turn to empirical tests of the model, we can 
control for other features of the household that may facilitate cooperation, such as capacity for 
monitoring or expectations about future interactions. We show that, when altruism between two 
players improves the static non-cooperative outcome, it also reduces the gains to cooperation, 
encouraging cooperation with a non-altruistic player over an altruistic one when transaction costs 
are fixed. We also consider how altruism may affect the feasibility and renegotiation-proofness 
of cooperative equilibria when commitment is imperfect. 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
Consider a polygynous household with a husband (h) and his two wives (w1 and w2). Each 
individual has preferences over own consumption of two goods (x and z). Additionally, husbands 
and wives derive utility from each other’s consumption of good z, but co-wives exhibit no 
altruism towards each other. 
          ,   ,   ,     and             ,   ,    	∀  ∈  1,2  
Note that our characterization of altruism follows that of Fehr and Schmidt (2006), in which the 
utility of an individual is increasing in the consumption of another person (other people). 
Preferences are not functionally interdependent, as each player cares only about the final 
allocation of resources and not how that allocation was reached or the utility other players 
actually receive from the allocation. 
The feature of the z good that drives the main implications of the model is that the altruist 
cannot purchase it directly or, more generally, the altruist and the subject face different implicit 
prices for the same good.
 6 Thus, even with interdependent preferences (      enters the utility 
                                                            
6 Alternatively, we could allow both the husband and wife to purchase all z goods directly, but at different prices. 
Note that, if both players can purchase the public good at the same price and both make strictly positive  
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function of i), the main implications of the model will still hold, provided the altruist does not 
fully internalize the effect of his actions on other(s) (i.e., at the point where utility is maximized, 
           ⁄  m i n          ⁄ ,         ⁄  ). This is very similar to the separate spheres assumption 
in Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and is consistent with many common forms of altruism (e.g., 
preferences for the utility of one’s spouse, parents’ preferences for children’s future earnings, 
preferences for the well-being of individuals in another country/class). And, if we think of z as 
child “quality”, this assumption is also consistent with anthropological descriptions of Burkinabé 
households, with wives having ultimate control over the care of their own children. More 
generally, we could think of z as a vector, with some elements being private goods that provide 
derived utility (aesthetic appearance of one’s spouse, cleanliness of the wife’s home) and other 
elements being public goods for the conjugal unit (child quality). Moreover, a subset of the z-
vector (e.g., meals, childcare) may overlap across family members, including co-wives, with the 
important distinction that, even where elements of z overlap, each individual possesses the ability 
to purchase that good directly. 
On the production side, each individual operates one plot of agricultural land. Farm 
production utilizes both male labor (NM) and female labor (NF), which are imperfect substitutes. 
Although all individuals have access to the same production technology, they are endowed with 
plots with different characteristics (e.g., size, soil type, toposequence), denoted A, that affect the 
optimal input mix. Denote each individual’s production function as follows: 
            ,   ;    ,              ,   ;     ,              ,   ;      
Farm production is the only source of income, with the price of output normalized to one, and 
each individual supplies one unit of labor inelastically. Each pair of players may negotiate a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
contributions, an efficient allocation of resources can be achieved even without explicit cooperation among players 
(Warr, 1983 and Bergstrom et al., 1986).  
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cooperative agreement for labor-sharing.
7 This agreement stipulates plot-specific labor 
allocations for each player as well as a (net) payment from j to i,   
 , (with   
        
 ). For the 
moment, we assume that cooperative agreements are fully binding; however we impose a fixed 
cost of c ≥ 0, per player, for negotiating each cooperative agreement. Each player may also 
choose to forgo explicit arrangements for cooperation, in which case he/she will not incur any 
costs. 
3.2 Stage Game with Transaction Costs 
Clearly, multiple equilibria are possible in this very general model. What we wish to establish 
here is that there exists a Nash equilibrium in which co-wives cooperate with each other in each 
period, but never cooperate with the husband. To see this, note that co-wives will be willing to 
cooperate with each other as long as the gains to cooperation exceed the cost 
                        
       
    2        [ 1 ]  
where ^ denotes the allocations that prevail when only the co-wives cooperate and ′	 denotes the 
allocations that prevail when no cooperative agreements have been reached. However, they will 
not additionally cooperate with the husband if the marginal benefit, conditional on cooperating 
with the co-wife, does not exceed the cost 
  2         
∗     
∗                 ∀  ∈  1,2      [ 2 ]  
where * denotes the allocations that prevail when a wife is cooperating with both her husband 
and her co-wife. Provided the optimal allocation of female labor on each wife’s plot is not equal 
to the time endowment (T), there exist gains from trade, and condition [1] will hold for some 
arbitrarily small value of c. Conversely, the second condition must hold for some arbitrarily large 
value of c. Given that male and female labor are imperfect substitutes in farm production, there 
                                                            




exist gains from trade between husbands and wives, even if co-wives are already cooperating, 
which suggests c > 0. 
Thus, for some intermediate value of c > 0, there exists an equilibrium in which co-wives 
cooperate with each other but not with their husbands, as long as each wife finds cooperating 
with only her co-wife to be more beneficial than cooperating with only her husband. Because 
each wife derives utility from her husband’s consumption of z, this condition must be expressed 
in terms of utility rather than income:            
              
  . Taking a linear approximation, 
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where        are total earnings (recall that R is the net transfer between cooperating 
players). Then                   is the net income gain for wife i when co-wives cooperate only 
with each other, and	                  is the net income gain when wife i cooperates only with the 
husband. To simplify this expression further, note that, at the constrained optimum, 
    
   
 
    
   
  	. 
And, taking into account the budget constraint, we can rewrite condition [3] as follows: 
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1
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1
  
      
               is exactly the total surplus generated by the cooperative agreement between the 
husband and wife i. Provided the marginal utility of own consumption exceeds that for 
consumption of others and the utility function is well-behaved,  
    
   
 
    
   
	and	
     
   
   0 	 ,   
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a sufficient condition for [3] is to verify that the surplus generated by co-wives cooperating 
exceeds the surplus generated by each wife cooperating with the husband independently. 
                       
       
                         
      
  	∀  ∈  1,2    [4] 
Recall that 
~ refers to outcomes when wife i cooperates only with the husband. This condition 
also ensures that the husband cannot entice either wife to cooperate with him by offering her a 
much larger share of the surplus, because the co-wife can always offer her a slightly larger 
payment. And, she would be willing to do so because this would allow her to still retain a smaller 
amount of the cooperative surplus, rather than being excluded entirely.
8 
Condition [4] does not necessarily imply that the total cooperative output generated by 
the co-wives exceeds the output that could be generated by the husband and wife together. In 
fact, given that male and female labor are imperfect substitutes, it is more likely that the opposite 
is true. However, the surplus that is generated, above and beyond the non-cooperative 
equilibrium, may be greater when co-wives cooperate if, as is suggested in the anthropological 
literature (Dey 1997), husbands and wives pool some resources even in the absence of an explicit 
cooperative agreement, whereas co-wives do not. Altruistic preferences make it more probable 
that husbands and wives engage in some minimal exchange behavior even when no cooperative 
agreement is reached. Put another way, in the absence of cooperative agreements, each husband-
wife pair is closer to the Pareto frontier for agricultural production than is the wife-wife pair. 
More formally, assume that each wife chooses x and z to maximize her utility, subject to 
her husband’s choice of z and the income generated on her plot. The husband chooses x and z to 
                                                            
8 We can ensure that this equilibrium is coalition-proof (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987) by assuming that the 
husband cannot simultaneously offer both wives agreements that dominate the agreement between co-wives 
                     
       
                           
      
                          
      
     
where ˙ denotes the allocations that prevail when both wives cooperate with the husband but not each other. This is a 
somewhat extreme case. In a repeated game, as we describe below, we can maintain condition [4] and ensure the 
equilibrium is coalition-proof by assuming that coalitions, once formed, cannot be re-formed for some minimum 
number of periods such that the gain to deviating is not Pareto-improving for any coalition.  
13 
 
maximize his own utility, subject to his wives’ choices of z and his own agricultural production. 
Additionally, the husband chooses how to allocate his labor between his own and his wives’ 
plots, recognizing that an increase in the wives’ income will increase their purchases of z as well. 
  max  
  ,  
  ,        ,   ,   ,      subject to         1    
      
 ,   
      
 ;             
   and        
∗   
  ,   
      
 ,   ,     for i = 1,2 
where μ represents parameters of the wives’ utility functions,   
   represents male labor allocated 
to wife i’s plot and   
  represents wife i’s labor allocated to the husband’s plot. From the first 
order condition, 
   
   
   
∗
   
   
   
   
    
   
  	for	    1,2 
we see that the optimal allocation of labor to wife i’s plot is strictly greater than zero, as long as 
the husband’s marginal utility of    exceeds his marginal utility of x and the wife’s choice of z is 
increasing in the labor he allocates to her plot. 
Moreover, the husband’s allocation of labor in the absence of a cooperative agreement 
will not be efficient because production and consumption decisions are not separable. To see this 
more clearly, rewrite the above condition as 
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where   
  represents wife i’s labor on her own plot. In order for the marginal product of the 
husband’s labor to be equalized across plots, the marginal rate of transformation between x and z, 
in utility terms, must be equal to one, and both wives’ labor allocations to wife i’s plot must be 
independent of the husband’s labor allocation. Each wife solves 
    max
  
 ,  
 ,         ,   ,      subject to           
  , 1    
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∗ 1     
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which gives us the following first order condition for   
  for an interior solution.  
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The wife is willing to provide labor on her husband’s plot as long as he is willing to provide 
enough labor to offset the decline in her production, net of the utility gain she receives via the 
husband’s increased consumption of z. Both spouses should benefit from this arrangement if, in 
the absence of labor-sharing, the marginal product of own labor is lower on own plots than on 
spouses’ plots. Note that, when simply maximizing own utility, co-wives will not provide labor 
on each other’s plots because they do not expect reciprocity. However, as long as the husband 
and wife are at an interior solution, her labor allocation will be responsive to his choices. Thus, 
although the husband and wife supply labor on each other’s plots even in the absence of an 
explicit cooperative agreement, they do not reach an efficient outcome. This result is, of course, 
sensitive to the separate spheres assumption and is a result of the husband and wife not being 
able to purchase each other’s z-goods directly. 
3.3 Repeated Game with Limited Commitment 
If transaction costs are reduced or eliminated then, all else equal, a Pareto efficient outcome is 
feasible, with all three players cooperating and pooling labor. However, we must also consider 
the possibility that players may renege on established cooperative agreements. Because each 
player retains control over the output produced on his/her own plot (as is consistent with the 
anthropological literature from West Africa), it is possible to renege on both the labor allocated 
to other players’ plots and the payment R. Clearly, with limited enforcement, cooperation cannot 
be sustained in a one-shot (or finitely repeated) game. However, if the stage game is repeated  
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infinitely and players are sufficiently forward-looking, then Nash reversion (Friedman, 1971) 
may be used to sustain cooperative agreements. First, consider the punishment phase in which 
the players revert to their non-cooperative Nash strategies for a predetermined number of 
periods. In this equilibrium, altruism between the husband and wife leads to some strictly 
positive labor-sharing, even though wife i does not share labor with her co-wife. Thus, as long as 
condition [3] above still holds, the gains to cooperating with the co-wife exceed the gains to 
cooperating with the husband which, in turn, implies that, under Nash reversion, wife j can hold 
wife i to a more severe punishment than can her husband. 
Next, consider a deviation by player i from the equilibrium in which all players behave 
cooperatively. When deviating from a cooperative agreement with player j, player i withholds 
both labor as well as any positive payments owed to player j (  
 ∗
 0 ), while the other players 
continue to provide the agreed-upon payments and/or labor on player i's plot. Total income for 
player i, conditional on reneging on his/her agreement with player j, is then 
               	    
 ∗
     
 ∗
	 
where       is the output player i produces by sharing labor with player k but not player j. This 
payoff is positively correlated with the surplus that would have been generated by cooperation, 
because the sum of       and   
 ∗
 is (weakly) increasing in the quantity of labor to be shared. 
Condition [4] then implies that the gain to deviating from an agreement with the co-wife should 
be greater. However, when wife i deviates from a cooperative agreement with the husband, she 
allocates strictly less labor to his plot than she would in the Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the gain 
in output is greater when deviating against the husband than the co-wife. Moreover, the more 
labor-sharing there is in the one-shot Nash equilibrium, the greater are the gains in output.  
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But, when wife i deviates from a cooperative agreement with her husband, towards whom 
she is altruistic, she is also penalized via a reduction in her husband’s consumption of z. 
However, the optimal deviation, though it involves less labor-sharing than the Nash strategy, will 
not be to supply zero labor on her husband’s plot (recall that labor-sharing with the co-wife is 
exactly zero under the Nash strategy). In fact, under the optimal deviation, the value of the 
marginal unit of own labor on wife i’s plot just offsets the loss from her husband’s reduced 
consumption of z (see condition [6]). 
    
   
    
   
    
    
   
   
∗
   
  
Thus, whether wife i deviates against her husband or co-wife, in both cases she is able to fully 
capture the value of the other’s labor to her plot as well as the labor she should have allocated to 
his/her plot, although she converts the income gains into utility with different bundles of goods. 
Deviating against the husband will, therefore, yield both greater income and greater utility than 
deviating against the co-wife, while the threat of punishment from the husband is weaker. 
Altruism between the husband and wife makes cooperation more difficult to sustain. 
Of course, if the husband and wife j can jointly punish wife i for deviating from either 
agreement, then cooperation among all three players could be sustained. However, joint 
punishment is not subgame-perfect, as condition [4] implies that wife i can always offer wife j a 
higher pay-off by deviating from the joint punishment to co-wife cooperation. Alternatively, we 
can consider a min-max punishment strategy, in which the husband punishes a deviation by wife 
i by allocating zero labor to her plot until she again plays cooperatively. This would be a more 
severe punishment than Nash reversion and could be sufficient to sustain cooperation even when 
Nash reversion cannot, but it is not weakly renegotiation-proof (Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti, 
1993). Once in the punishment phase, both the husband and wife i would be better off playing  
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the Nash equilibrium. Because of the altruistic linkage between the two, the husband’s utility is 
increasing in the wife’s payoff and, therefore, there does not exist a tit-for-tat punishment that 
rewards the husband while min-maxing wife i. We could consider a tit-for-tat punishment in 
which the husband receives at least his Nash payoff as well as a side payment from the wife – 
consisting of his private good, the public good or a combination of the two – at the expense of 
her own private consumption. However, the wife will be tempted to renege in the punishment 
phase and, if she were to do so, the strongest punishment the husband could invoke would be the 
min-max strategy. Thus, this equilibrium too would unravel with renegotiation. 
We have shown the existence of an equilibrium in which, within a polygynous 
household, co-wives cooperate with each other but not with their husband. Altruism between the 
husband and each wife makes such an equilibrium more likely, for three reasons. First, in the 
presence of transaction costs, each player may choose to invest only in the single most beneficial 
cooperative agreement. Because altruism facilitates exchange behavior even in the absence of an 
explicit agreement, it reduces the gains to cooperation, making cooperative agreements between 
husbands and wives less likely. Second, altruism can both increase the gains to deviating from a 
cooperative agreement and reduce the severity of the punishment that may be imposed. Then, in 
the presence of limited commitment, a non-altruistic party (a co-wife) is better able to prevent 
deviations from the cooperative agreement and, therefore, better able to sustain cooperation. 
Note that, in the presence of transaction costs, we could observe wives cooperating with 
husbands in a monogamous arrangement, but then electing to cooperate with a co-wife instead 
when placed in a polygynous arrangement. Limited commitment could not generate such a 
result, unless polygyny somehow affects the capacity for binding agreements between husbands 
and wives. Finally, even when the altruistic party is willing to impose very severe punishments,  
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these will not be renegotiation-proof because altruism makes it impossible to punish the 
deviating player while rewarding the cooperating player. Thus, payoffs in the punishment phase 
will be Pareto-dominated by the Nash equilibrium. 
These results are sensitive to our separate spheres-type assumption although, based on the 
anthropological evidence, it seems to be an accurate representation of Burkinabé households. 
Moreover, the notion of a good over which one has preferences but no direct control is consistent 
with many formulations of altruism (e.g., parents’ preferences for children’s future earnings, 
preferences for the well-being of individuals in another country/class). The basic framework and 
implications can, therefore, be applied to a variety of contexts, even though they have been 
derived from the very specific case of polygynous households. 
4. Empirical Application 
4.1 Testable Implications 
To generate testable implications from our theoretical model, recall that cooperation maximizes 
joint farm production and equalizes the marginal productivity of inputs across plots controlled by 
the cooperating individuals. This also implies that, controlling for land characteristics, crop 
choice and shocks to the production process, yields should be equalized across these plots. We 
estimate plot yield as a function of plot characteristics (area, soil type, toposequence, location) 
and cultivator characteristics (gender, relation to household head – head, wife, or other), 
conditional on a household-crop-year fixed effect. That is, we examine the deviation of plot yield 
from mean yield as a function of the deviation of plot characteristics from mean plot 
characteristics within a group of plots planted to the same crop by members of the same 
household in a given calendar year (Udry, 1996). Yield Q for plot i, planted with crop c, in year 
t, in household h can be expressed as:  
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where        
                ∗   
   for k = G, OM, OF. X is a vector of plot characteristics, G is 
gender of the plot cultivator (1=female), OM and OF are indicators equal to one if the plot 
cultivator is an “other male” (not the household head) or an “other female” (not a wife of the 
head), respectively, λ is a household-crop-year fixed effect, and ε is an error-term. Cultivator 
characteristics (gender and relationship to household head) are allowed to differ for polygynous 
households via an interaction with an indicator for polygyny (Poly).
9 The data, unfortunately, do 
not link agricultural plots to individual identifiers, so we are unable to identify the specific 
relationship of the cultivator to the head or to other household members. We are also unable to 
differentiate senior and junior wives in polygynous households. 
The interactions between polygyny and cultivator characteristics tell us how the variation 
in yields between cultivators differs across monogamous and polygynous households. We can 
attribute this difference to the causal effect of additional wives in the household as long as the 
household-crop-year fixed effects account for unobserved characteristics that are correlated with 
both conjugal status and the difference in yields between cultivator types, conditional on planting 
the same crop, in the same year, in the same household. In Section 4.3, we present several tests 
of the robustness of this strategy. Given a negative coefficient on gender, then a positive 
coefficient on the interaction between polygyny and gender indicates that the yield differential 
between husbands and wives is smaller when the husband has multiple wives. However, this may 
be indicative of either cooperation among co-wives or (greater) cooperation between husbands 
and wives. To differentiate these, we need to examine how polygyny affects the yield differential 
between husbands and other cultivators. A decline in other cultivators’ yields, relative to the 
                                                            
9 Akresh, Chen and Moore (2012) use a similar specification but do not differentiate “other” cultivators by gender.  
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household head, suggests that the head himself is also able to achieve a more efficient allocation 
of agricultural inputs in the presence of multiple wives, whereas an increase in other cultivators’ 
yields, again relative to the head, suggests that wives cooperate more with each other (and 
perhaps with other cultivators) than with the household head. 
By including indicators for the relationship of the cultivator to the household head, we 
can look more closely at other opportunities and incentives for cooperation among household 
members. In the previous section, we make the case that a positive coefficient on the interaction 
between polygyny and gender is the result of greater altruism between husbands and wives than 
between co-wives. However, we would observe the same result if the cost of cooperation is 
simply lower among women, not necessarily just co-wives. In this case, the presence of 
additional women, in the form of polygyny, should facilitate greater cooperation among all 
women and therefore reduce any difference in yields between wives and other female cultivators. 
Alternatively, the household head may be able to serve as an enforcement mechanism for 
cooperative arrangements among other household members. That is, with multiple wives, the 
head may be able to enforce an optimal allocation of agricultural inputs among their plots, even 
when he is unable to enforce cooperative arrangements between himself and his wives, because 
he can act as a third-party monitor/arbitrator. In this case, the head should be able to enforce 
cooperation between other cultivators within the household as well, resulting in smaller yield 
differences among other cultivators who are not the household head or wife (wives). 
These dynamics, summarized in the table below, allow us to distinguish between 
alternative explanations for smaller male-female yield differentials in polygynous households. 
Our altruism story is consistent only with the first row. However, if women prefer to cooperate 
with each other over men, we will observe a smaller yield differential between wives and other   
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Hypothesis Testable  Implication 
Greater cooperation among 
co-wives than among 
husbands and wives 
Smaller yield differential between husbands and wives in the 
presence of multiple wives, and smaller or unchanged yield 
differential between husbands and other male cultivators  
  
   0  and    
   0  
Greater cooperation among 
women than among men 
Smaller yield differential between wives and other female 
cultivators in the presence of multiple wives (more women) 
  
   0  and    
   0  
Household head serves as 
low-cost enforcement 
mechanism for others’ 
cooperative arrangements 
Smaller yield differential between other male cultivators and 
other female cultivators than between husbands and wives 
  
   0  and            0  
 
females in polygynous households as well as a smaller yield differential between men and 
women in polygynous households. Alternatively, if the household head acts as an enforcement 
mechanism for cooperative arrangements, we should observe smaller yield differentials among 
other cultivator pairs, in addition to co-wives.  And, if co-wives find the head to be less credible 
as a neutral third-party than do other cultivator pairs, then we should only observe cooperation 
between co-wives in conjunction with cooperation between other cultivator pairs. Given the 
importance of order and rank in the treatment of co-wives (Boye et al., 1991; Mammen, 2004 
and Kazianga and Klonner, 2009), this seems plausible. In this case, the three hypotheses have 
distinct empirical implications. 
4.2 Main Results 
Column I of Table 2 replicates the household-crop-year fixed effects specification in Udry 
(1996), using only data for the years 1984-85.
10 We find a negative and significant effect of 
cultivator gender on plot yield, but the magnitude is larger than in Udry. This difference is, in 
part, a result of the ICRISAT survey design. In 1981-83 (the data used in Udry’s analysis), 
detailed information was collected for a selected sample of plots (all cereal, cotton, and root 
                                                            
10 In addition to including household-crop-year fixed effects, all regressions have controls for plot size (by decile), 
soil type, toposequence, and location.  
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crops, but only one plot under the management of the household head and one plot of his senior 
wife for legume or other garden crops), whereas summary information was collected for all plots 
in 1984-85 (Matlon 1988). Note that, because we are interested in the yields of other cultivators, 
particularly senior as well as junior co-wives, and wives devote a greater proportion of plots to 
legume and garden crops, data from 1981-83 suffer from significant sample selection and are, 
therefore, excluded from our estimates. In column II, we add indicators for other male and other 
female cultivators within the household. The coefficient on gender is still statistically significant 
and similar in magnitude. Other male cultivators are found to have significantly lower yields, 
relative to the household head, again consistent with findings in Udry (1996), suggesting that 
inefficiencies in intrahousehold allocation arise along other dimensions, in addition to gender. 
In column III of Table 2, we add interactions of cultivator characteristics with an 
indicator for polygyny, as well as interactions of all plot characteristics with the indicator for 
polygyny, to allow for differences in technology across household types.
11 Wives in polygynous 
households have significantly higher yields than wives in monogamous households, relative to 
the household head, and the same is true for other male cultivators. This is consistent with 
greater cooperation among co-wives than among husbands and wives. The point estimate for 
   
  	 is consistent with stronger preferences for cooperation among women but is not statistically 
significant, and there is no significant difference between wives and other females to begin with. 
We do not find evidence of the household head acting as an enforcement mechanism; although 
the point estimates are consistent with this story, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficient on other male is equal to the coefficient on other female (p-value = 0.196). Thus, 
                                                            
11 We easily reject the hypothesis that the interactions of polygyny with plot characteristics are not jointly 
significant, (F( 25, 3323) = 6.55, p-value = 0.000), so we include them in all specifications that distinguish 
monogamous and polygynous households.   
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while we do not find evidence in favor of these alternative explanations, we cannot yet 
confidently rule them out.
12 
Limiting the estimation to specific cultivator pairs provides some corroborating evidence 
to distinguish these hypotheses. Identification in Table 3 relies on variation in yields across plots 
planted with the same crop, in the same year, within the same household, between only two types 
of cultivators, rather than all four types. In column I, we see that polygyny reduces the male-
female yield differential even when the sample is limited to plots cultivated by the household 
head and his wife (wives). Focusing on plots cultivated by other males and other females (Table 
3, column II) shows that yield differences are nearly identical to those between husbands and 
wives, providing more conclusive evidence that heads are not enforcing cooperation among other 
cultivators, in either monogamous or polygynous households.  
When the estimation is limited to only male cultivators (column III), we again find that 
the difference in yields between the head and other males is significantly smaller in polygynous 
households. Polygyny allows other male cultivators to narrow the gap in yields, relative to the 
head, which suggests that husbands’ yields suffer, rather than benefit, from polygyny.
13 This 
indicates that cooperation among co-wives is not supplementing cooperation between husbands 
and wives; rather, arrangements among co-wives appear to be either replacing those between 
husbands and wives or emerging where husband-wife cooperation is unsustainable. Based on our 
simple model, this could only occur when there are significant transactions costs associated with 
cooperation; limited commitment alone is not sufficient to generate this result. That is, if a 
husband-wife pair was able to sustain cooperation in a monogamous arrangement, that 
                                                            
12 We discuss column IV in Table 2 after the Table 3 results. 
13 Note that this does not necessarily imply that polygynous household heads are less productive than other male 
cultivators in the same household, only that they receive fewer inputs relative to other male cultivators, compared to 
monogamous households.  
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arrangement should also be sustainable when a second wife is added, unless cooperation is no 
longer mutually beneficial (i.e., transaction costs erode the gains to cooperation).   
However, limiting the estimation to female-cultivated plots still does not allow us to rule 
out a greater propensity for cooperation among women generally. Yields for other female 
cultivators are not significantly different from those for wives of the household head, in either 
monogamous or polygynous households (column IV). To test this more directly, we can look at 
how the presence of another female cultivator, not a wife of the household head, affects 
efficiency within the household. In effect, we compare the male-female yield differential across 
households that do and do not include an “other female” cultivator. We limit this estimation to 
household heads and their wives to ensure that the coefficients on the female dummy variable 
and its interactions are not driven by the behavior of the other female cultivators themselves. In 
column V of Table 3, we see that the presence of an additional female cultivator in the household 
significantly increases the difference in yields between husbands and wives, and polygyny again 
eliminates this gap, although the point estimates are imprecise. This is not consistent with 
stronger preferences for cooperation among all women; rather, the identity of the “additional” 
woman – wife of the head or other female – determines whether her presence will worsen or 
improve allocative efficiency within the household. 
Our simple model shows that cooperation between altruistic parties can actually be more 
difficult to sustain than that between purely self-interested parties. We test this by comparing the 
male-female yield gap across monogamous and polygynous households, where polygyny 
represents the addition of a potential collaborator with altruistic preferences towards the husband 
but not the co-wife. However, this contrast between husband-wife and co-wife interaction 
provides a second testable implication: the likelihood of cooperation should be declining in the  
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degree of altruism between players. If altruism is, at least in part, based in children as a shared 
public good, then we should see greater cooperation (smaller yield differences) among couples 
who have fewer children and, therefore, fewer shared goods. Consistent with this, we see that the 
interaction of number of children of the household head
14 with the indicator for female 
cultivators is negative and significant (column IV, Table 2), and the direct effect for female 
cultivators is now not statistically significant. This suggests that there is no statistical difference 
in yields between husbands and wives when there are no children in the home – i.e., when they 
do not share public goods, particularly those that tend to fall into separate production spheres.   
In polygynous households, the direct effect is also small and not statistically significant, 
again about one-quarter of the estimate in column III. But the interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant and almost entirely offsets the effect of children on women’s yields in 
monogamous households. The opposite sign for polygynous households also suggests that this 
specification is not just picking up some effect of childcare on time allocation and productivity. 
Women in polygynous households are better able to specialize and optimally distribute childcare 
and farm duties amongst each other, presumably via cooperative arrangements, but women in 
monogamous households are unable to do the same with their husbands. We do not wish to rely 
too heavily on these results, as fertility may be correlated with the degree of efficiency or 
cooperation within the household. However, this specification does provide some additional 
suggestive evidence in support of our altruism story, over alternate explanations. 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
To further support our story, we would also like to find differences in input usage that could 
explain the observed differences in yields among cultivators within the same household. 
Unfortunately, data on the use of agricultural inputs is quite limited for the years in which we 
                                                            
14 Includes only children of the head currently living in the household.  
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have information on all plots cultivated by the household (1984-85). We are unable to compare 
the use of male and female labor across plots controlled by different cultivators, making it 
difficult to corroborate directly our hypotheses regarding labor-sharing. Moreover, input data 
from 1984-85 are subject to significant measurement error, as they are based on recall at the end 
of each year. Using panel Tobit estimation (Honoré, 1992) and again controlling for household-
crop-year fixed effects, we find suggestive evidence that women use inputs less intensively. 
Coefficients on the indicator for female are negative for labor hours in land improvement 
(clearing, burning, and bund construction), value of paid labor, manure, and length of fallow, 
although the point estimates are generally imprecise (columns I-III, Table 4). There are no 
significant differences for cultivators in polygynous households, although the estimated 
coefficients are of the opposite sign (except in the case of manure). 
We lack data on many other inputs, but the estimates, although not conclusive, are 
consistent with women in polygynous households being better able to offset less intensive use of 
paid labor with a more efficient allocation of labor throughout the cropping season, providing 
some indirect evidence for our labor-sharing hypothesis. However, women also appear to follow 
shorter cropping cycles (columns IV and V, Table 4), keeping plots fallow for shorter periods of 
time but also allowing significantly fewer years between fallow periods. This is consistent with 
findings in Goldstein and Udry (2008) and may be indicative of differences in property rights for 
men and women. Point estimates are again of the opposite sign for women in polygynous 
households but not statistically significant. The more frequent fallowing does not appear to be 
sufficient to offset differences in yields between men and women, which suggests that the intra-
household allocation of some other inputs, perhaps including length of fallow, must be sub-
optimal as well. These results may also reflect differences in plot history or crop rotation (recall  
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that the fixed effects control only for the current crop) if, for example, women tend to farm crops 
that are less deleterious to soil quality. 
Alternatively, differences in fallow may point to differences in unobserved plot quality, 
which would pose a significant threat to our identification strategy. It may be the case that wives 
in polygynous households are endowed with plots of better unobserved quality. Unfortunately, 
we cannot test for this directly because plot borders change from year to year, making it 
impossible to identify any time-invariant plot fixed effects. Omitting all plot characteristics (size, 
toposequence, soil type, location) from our preferred specification decreases the magnitude of 
the coefficients on both the indicator for female and the interaction of gender with polygyny, 
leaving the total effect for women in polygynous households essentially unchanged (column I, 
Table 5). Assuming observed and unobserved plot characteristics are positively correlated, our 
results are consistent with higher unobserved plot quality for women, but this does not appear to 
differ across monogamous and polygynous households. Moreover, polygyny is found to increase 
yields equally for wives and other female cultivators, and it is not clear why other female 
cultivators in polygynous households would also have higher quality plots even though other 
male cultivators do not or, put another way, why greater wealth in polygynous households would 
translate into differentially higher quality for all women’s plots. 
The design of the ICRISAT survey provides a further opportunity to test the robustness of 
our results. In the 1981-83 years of the study, data on the plots of junior wives were collected 
only for cotton, cereal, and root crops, which are representative of less than 40 percent of the 
plots controlled by wives (Table 1). This selection is not necessarily problematic if the behavior 
of junior and senior wives is comparable. However, with the inclusion of household-crop-year 
fixed effects, the 1981-83 data only allow us to examine the variation in yields across plots  
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planted with the same crop by the household head and his senior wife, with the exception of 
cotton, cereal and root crops. In contrast, the 1984-85 data provide variation in yields across 
plots planted with the same crop by the head and senior wife as well as by the senior and junior 
wives for all crops.
15 Thus, the beneficial effect of polygyny on women’s yields should be much 
more muted in 1981-83, unless it is driven by unobserved heterogeneity across monogamous and 
polygynous households. Conversely, if the smaller gender yield differential in polygynous 
households is the result of greater cooperation between husbands and wives, instead of, or in 
addition to, greater cooperation between co-wives, then the same effect should be evident when 
we look predominantly at plots controlled by the head and the senior wife, omitting most of 
those controlled by the junior wives. Results shown in column II of Table 5 are not consistent 
with either of these alternate explanations. The coefficient on the interaction between female and 
polygynous is very small in magnitude and not statistically significant. 
Clearly, polygyny could be correlated with unobserved characteristics of the household 
such as wealth, capital and family size (Jacoby, 1995; Tertilt, 2005). Household-crop-year fixed 
effects control for any such factors that affect men and women in the same household identically, 
conditional on planting the same crop, in the same year. However, they will not account for 
differences in crop choice or in the propensity for cooperation. When we split the data according 
to cereal and non-cereal crops, it becomes evident that non-cereal crops are driving the main 
results (columns III and IV, Table 5). For cereal crops, the coefficient on gender is much smaller 
in magnitude, as is the coefficient on gender interacted with polygyny, and neither is statistically 
significant. The opposite is true for non-cereal crops. However, wives in polygynous households 
devote a greater percentage of their plots to cereal crops (38 versus 24 percent, see Table 1), so 
                                                            
15 For example, in 1981-83, we essentially would not observe variation in yields across plots planted with okra, a 
predominantly female crop planted on over 20 percent of wives’ plots and less than 1 percent of heads’ plots.  
29 
 
differences in crop choice attenuate observed differences in cooperative behavior across 
monogamous and polygynous households. 
It is not clear whether the pattern described above is the result of (endogenous) 
differences in crop choice across monogamous and polygynous households, or whether this 
simply reflects stronger social norms governing the pooling of resources in the production of 
staple foods, the majority of which occurs on household communal plots. A complete model of 
crop choice is beyond the scope of the current paper, but we can utilize an alternative 
specification to look at within-household yield differences a bit more generally. Using household 
(rather than household-crop-year) fixed effects allows us to identify gender differences from 
variation across all plots cultivated by the household, rather than only those planted with the 
same crop. But, because weather variability and other time-varying factors may differentially 
affect certain crops, we also include village-crop-year fixed effects to account for aggregate 
crop-specific shocks. With this specification, we obtain the same qualitative results in terms of 
sign and significance, although the point estimates are considerably smaller in magnitude (Table 
6, panel A). This suggests that the main results cannot be explained, at least not entirely, by 
differences in crop choice across monogamous and polygynous households. 
And, because cultivator characteristics are included as control variables, we can interpret 
the household fixed effects implied by this specification as a measure of the latent productivity 
of the household head, net of plot characteristics and aggregate village-crop-year farming 
conditions. In Panel B of Table 6, we regress the implied household fixed effects on various 
characteristics of the household, to determine how polygyny is related to the level of production, 
in addition to the differences between cultivators. Without including any controls, the household 
fixed effect is not significantly different across monogamous and polygynous households.  
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Adding controls for village- and time-fixed effects increases the magnitude of the coefficient on 
polygyny, and the point estimates now indicate a statistically significant difference, with heads in 
polygynous households having higher latent productivity than those in monogamous 
households.
16 Thus, greater yields for women in polygynous households appear to be a level 
effect, and not simply indicative of a reduction in the productivity of polygynous household 
heads.  Comparison of columns I and II suggests that polygynous households are more likely to 
be located in regions with lower agricultural productivity, consistent with anthropological 
evidence that polygyny is driven primarily by ethno-cultural traditions, rather than agricultural 
practices. In contrast, controls for household composition, total cultivated area and capital 
intensity do not significantly affect the magnitude of the coefficient on polygyny. 
To test for the possibility that households that achieve more efficient allocations are more 
likely to take on additional wives, we compare polygynous households with different numbers of 
wives. That is, if more efficient households also take on more wives, the positive effects of 
polygyny should also be more pronounced for households with greater numbers of wives. We 
find no evidence of this; the point estimates for cultivator characteristics interacted with 
polygyny are not significantly different when we restrict the definition of polygyny to exactly 
two wives or more than two wives, respectively (columns I and II of Table 7). Of course, we 
cannot rule out the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship between number of wives and 
efficiency or preferences for cooperation (e.g., a threshold effect around exactly two wives). 
Although we have shown that the effect of polygyny is not simply a scale effect – that is, 
the addition of an “other” female cultivator is not equivalent to the addition of a wife – it may 
still be the case that polygyny affects production decisions in another manner unrelated to 
cooperation. For example, perhaps multiple wives are able to meet labor requirements on 
                                                            





th percentiles yield similar results and are not shown here.  
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communal plots more quickly or efficiently, leaving more time for own cultivation. 
Alternatively, perhaps the household head is required to devote a fixed minimum amount of 
labor to his wives’ plots and polygyny, therefore, reduces the time available for his own 
cultivation. To check for these possibilities, we split the sample into two different types of 
households, with access to different mechanisms for contract enforcement. In vertically-extended 
households (head with adult children), the head is also the patriarch, and social norms may allow 
him to exert more influence over other household members and therefore enforce greater 
cooperation. Power dynamics are considerably more complex in horizontally-extended 
households (head with adult siblings), and the influence of the head may be undermined by 
coalitions among other household members. If polygyny causes changes in productive 
arrangements that are not the result of cooperative arrangements, then we should observe the 
same effects for both household types. However, in our model, polygyny should provide greater 
benefits for households with more limited scope for cooperation. 
We define horizontally-extended households as those that include a brother of the 
household head and vertically-extended households as those that do not. When we split the 
sample along these lines (columns III and IV of Table 7), we observe significant effects of 
polygyny only in horizontally-extended households. Because the same effects are not evident in 
vertically-extended households, where there is already greater scope for cooperation, our main 
results do not seem to be explained by a reorganization of productive activities outside of 
cooperative arrangements among cultivators, or a lack thereof. Interestingly, among vertically-
extended households, we observe no significant yield differences across conjugal status or 
cultivator type, and the point estimates are generally small in magnitude, consistent with (but not 
proof of) efficiency in production. This suggests that, where the household head is able to  
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enforce cooperation among other cultivators, he does so among all cultivators, without 
preference for certain types or pairs. Of course, to the extent that production in vertically-
extended households is already efficient, our falsification test may lack power in that there are no 
gains to be realized from polygyny. However, this seems to beg the question of why productive 
efficiency is related to the composition of the household and the relationships among members. 
4.4 Dynamic Inefficiency 
The degree of cooperation within a household clearly affects the efficiency of both production 
and consumption decisions. It can also have implications for growth if the scope for cooperation 
affects investment choice. Investments requiring large fixed costs will have higher returns when 
they can be used across plots controlled by more than one cultivator. Conversely, where there is 
little opportunity for cooperation, individuals may choose to invest in smaller capital goods or 
higher quality variable inputs that have both lower fixed costs and lower returns. In our final 
specification, we look at a household’s expenditure on large capital investments (plows, 
scarifiers, weeders, ridgers, line tracers, seeders, sprayers, carts, tractors and draft animals). To 
help control for the fact that larger and wealthier households are more likely to undertake such 
investments, we look at the expenditure on large capital investments as a percentage of the 
household’s total expenditure on agricultural inputs. We also control for household demographic 
composition and land holdings, treating the latter, as well as polygyny, as endogenous. Because 
both the outcome of interest and the regressor of interest are now at the household level, we can 
no longer include household fixed effects and must instead rely on the use of instrumental 
variables. As instruments, we use (1) the quantity of land that was acquired via inheritance and 
(2) the ethnic group of the household.  
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Although land tenure and property rights in Burkina Faso tend to follow a more informal 
“customary” system, inherited land is granted to the household for permanent cultivation 
(Stamm, 1994). The instrument should, therefore, isolate the variation in land area (wealth) that 
arises from the household’s relative position within the lineage, excluding differences due to 
heterogeneity in skill that are unobserved by the researcher but known to the head of the lineage. 
With regard to the second set of instruments, anthropologists note that polygyny has strong 
foundations in ethno-cultural traditions (Omariba and Boyle, 2007), while farming practices 
tended to be quite similar across ethnic groups, at least until very recently (Kevane and Grey, 
1999). However, because ethnic groups tend to be geographically concentrated and, therefore, in 
differing agro-climatic zones, we also include either village- and year- or village-year fixed 
effects, to account for regional and temporal differences. Our key identifying assumptions are 
that the percentage of spending on farm inputs devoted to large capital investments is not directly 
affected by either the long-term land allocation decisions of the lineage or the ethnic group of the 
household, conditional on household composition and village and year fixed effects. 
Without using instrumental variables, we find that household wealth, in the form of 
landholdings, has a significant positive effect on the percentage of expenditure on agricultural 
inputs that is devoted to large capital goods, while polygyny has essentially no effect (column I, 
Table 8). When estimating the IV regression, the coefficient on land holdings is close to zero and 
is no longer statistically significant. This suggests that asset accumulation, in both land and large 
capital investments, is driven by some unobserved third factor, such as ability or endowments. 
Conversely, the coefficient on polygyny increases in magnitude and becomes statistically 
significant after instrumental variables are included, suggesting that households who self-select 
into polygyny are, in fact, less likely to utilize a capital-intensive production process. This is  
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consistent with Tertilt (2005), which suggests that wives may serve as an alternate form of 
capital accumulation. Our second-stage estimates indicate that polygynous households spend 
more on large capital goods, as a percentage of their total expenditure on agricultural inputs, 
which are also goods for which the economic returns are increasing in the scope for cooperative 
behavior. Tests of over-identification lend support to the validity of our instruments, and the 
difference between the IV and OLS estimates are as expected. However, we cannot rule out the 
possibility of a weak instruments problem and, therefore, do not wish to rely too heavily on these 
estimates. Nonetheless, this exercise provides additional suggestive evidence to support to our 
altruism hypothesis as, all else equal, we would have expected more intensive use of indivisible 
goods to be associated with greater inefficiency in the allocation of farm inputs. 
5. Conclusion 
Polygyny creates opportunities for both cooperation and competition. We find that co-wives are 
more likely to cooperate with one another than with their husband, and this is the result of selfish 
behavior rather than altruism. Because of the altruism between husbands and wives, the non-
cooperative equilibrium does not differ much from the cooperative equilibrium, making the gains 
to cooperation greater for co-wives than for husband-wife pairs. Other female cultivators also 
seem to benefit from polygyny, suggesting that women, as a group, may have stronger 
preferences (lower costs) for cooperation. However, wives of the household head have 
significantly lower yields when there is another female cultivator present in the household. That 
is, cooperation among women appears to be influenced by identity/relationship as well as gender. 
We do not find evidence of the household head acting as a third-party enforcement mechanism 
for others’ cooperative agreements, except perhaps in the context of vertically-extended 
households, in which the head may have greater influence on other cultivators.  
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Our results do not appear to be driven by differences in crop choice or the propensity for 
cooperation between monogamous and polygynous households. Moreover, when junior wives’ 
plots are excluded from the estimation, we do not observe the same pattern, suggesting that the 
results are driven by interaction among co-wives, rather than fixed characteristics of polygynous 
households. We cannot definitively rule out the possibility of unobserved plot characteristics that 
are correlated with women’s yields in polygynous households. However, we do not observe 
differences in women’s fallow decisions across the two household types, and the positive effect 
of polygyny on other female cultivators rules out a simple story about better plot quality for 
subsequent wives. 
Altruism can facilitate cooperation by reducing transaction costs, improving information 
flows and ensuring repeat interaction. However, we show that altruism can also inhibit 
cooperation by increasing payoffs in the non-cooperative equilibrium and/or limiting the scope 
for (credible) punishment. Although we use the unique case of polygynous households to test 
this hypothesis, there are many situations in which our findings may be relevant. For example, 
trade agreements between countries that have historically contentious relationships may be more 
generous than those between friendly countries because shared political interests ensure amicable 
trade negotiations, even in the absence of an explicit agreement, and create a degree of altruism. 
The old adage about never mixing business with family/friends also seems to be rooted in the 
problems created specifically by altruistic linkages. Our findings also imply that there may be 
some notion of optimal social distance – perhaps policy makers could achieve better outcomes 
by targeting groups of individuals who belong to the same social network but are not directly 
connected (e.g., joint liability groups for microcredit, early adopters of new technologies, peer 
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Table 1. Yield, Area and Primary Crop, by Plot, Household Type and Cultivator
Monogamous Polygynous
Household Wife of Other Other Household Wife of Other Other
Head Head Male Female Head Head Male Female
Yield (1000 FCFA) 126.29 49.15 142.93 124.82 85.47 59.50 145.51 71.57
(651.6) (267.0) (498.2) (434.7) (341.3) (208.4) (358.6) (250.6)
Average Plot Size 0.748 0.075 0.318 0.069 0.756 0.099 0.385 0.074
  (hectare) (1.24) (0.13) (0.54) (0.12) (1.14) (0.14) (0.48) (0.10)
Observations 743 425 172 319 1156 1305 407 699
Percentage of Plots Planted with a Given Primary Crop
     Millet 27.05 9.18 25.00 7.52 18.94 11.42 13.51 6.58
     White Sorghum 20.46 8.71 19.77 10.66 22.92 21.30 29.73 12.45
     Red Sorghum 8.48 4.00 4.65 6.58 10.73 3.60 5.65 4.15
     Maize 17.50 2.35 8.72 0.94 15.57 2.15 8.60 3.72
     Groundnuts 4.44 18.35 8.72 - 6.14 18.62 10.32 -
     Okra 0.81 21.65 1.74 18.18 0.35 15.33 - 17.02
     Cotton 7.67 1.65 17.44 1.57 9.95 1.00 22.60 1.86
     Earthpeas/Fonio 1.62 28.23 2.32 36.05 1.04 19.08 1.72 45.21
     Others 11.97 5.89 11.62 18.48 14.38 7.51 7.88 9.01
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Data source: 1984-85 ICRISAT Burkina Faso survey. During 1984-85, the





Table 2. Fixed Effects Estimates of the





Gender (1=female) -74.51 *** -87.69 *** -202.21 *** -45.46
(15.39) (18.14) (34.14) (50.68)
Other Male -40.49 ** -97.18 **
(20.41) (39.38)
Other Female -12.77 -31.96
(15.37) (31.39)
Gender*No. of Kids -23.28 **
(10.27)
Gender*Polygynous 168.94 *** 41.94
(40.09) (64.85)




Gender*Poly*No. of Kids 22.15 *
(11.62)
Observations 5230 5230 5230 4701
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All specifications include household-crop-year
fixed effects and controls for plot size (by decile), soil type, toposequence and
location. Data source: 1984-85 ICRISAT Burkina Faso Survey.
aCalculated as value of plot output per hectare.





Table 3. Fixed Effects Estimates of the
Effect of Cultivator Characteristics on Plot Yield
a, Pairwise Groupings
Head and Other Head and
Wives Cultivators Men Only Women Only Wives
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)









Gender*Polygynous 118.52 ** 131.04 ** 33.67
(47.32) (61.80) (75.20)
Gender* Poly*Add'l Female 126.61
(88.86)




Observations 3629 1597 2478 2748 5230
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. All specifications include household-crop-year fixed effects and controls for 
plot size (by decile), soil type, toposequence, location and interactions with polygyny.
Data source: 1984-85 ICRISAT Burkina Faso Survey.
aCalculated as value of plot output per hectare.






Table 4. Panel Tobit Fixed Effects Estimates of Input Choice
Hours in Land Paid Labor Manure
Dependent Variable Improvement
a (1000 FCFA (1000 Kg Per Length of Years Since
(Per Hectare) Per Hectare) Hectare) Fallow
b Fallow
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Gender (1=female) -12.89 -2.27 -2.69 -3.82 *** -6.73 ***
(26.20) (2.29) (3.79) (1.04) (2.20)
Other Male -10.82 -5.97 -5.57 -2.12 * -9.48 **
(27.43) (5.01) (5.32) (1.20) (3.99)
Other Female 14.78 -10.03 15.45 -0.25 2.73
(33.66) (6.11) (25.12) (1.08) (2.14)
Gender*Polygynous 24.99 2.25 -4.04 1.79 1.31
(28.17) (3.15) (5.46) (1.15) (2.32)
Other Male*Poly -34.60 0.39 -3.03 1.50 2.34
(33.34) (5.49) (6.17) (1.35) (4.03)
Other Female*Poly -90.97 * 8.99 -21.45 0.26 -3.21
(48.54) (6.53) (25.91) (1.20) (2.33)
Mean 6.94 0.85 1.17 10.24 11.15
Mean if >0 62.74 5.30 9.30 14.58
Observations 5172 5230 5172 3076 4356
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. All specifications include household-crop-year fixed effects and controls for 
plot size (by decile), soil type, toposequence, location and interactions with polygyny.
Data source: 1984-85 ICRISAT Burkina Faso Survey.
aLand improvement refers to clearing, burning and bund construction.






Table 5. Fixed Effects Estimates of the Effect of
Cultivator Characteristics on Plot Yield
a, Alternate Specifications
No Plot 1981-83
Chars. Only Cereals Non-Cereals
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Gender (1=female) -125.67 *** -35.13 *** -51.61 -482.87 ***
(31.15) (12.48) (32.91) (74.50)
Other Male -8.52 -30.30 ** -92.94 ** -83.43
(36.98) (12.58) (37.39) (82.15)
Other Female -3.58 2.74 -70.15 * -23.15
(31.80) (15.60) (36.17) (51.06)
Gender*Polygynous 128.65 *** 1.66 10.01 452.14 ***
(35.90) (14.88) (38.45) (86.90)
Other Male*Poly 21.09 17.15 84.15 * 63.75
(43.12) (15.25) (43.47) (95.29)
Other Female*Poly 6.01 -23.77 68.88 17.24
(36.33) (18.53) (42.36) (57.24)
Observations 5230 4198 2923 2307
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All specifications include household-crop-year
fixed effects and controls for plot size (by decile), soil type, toposequence, location 
and interactions with polygyny. Data source: 1984-85 ICRISAT Burkina Faso Survey.






Table 6. Household Fixed Effects Estimates 
A. Plot Yield
a













B. Household Fixed Effect
b
Polygynous 3.76 12.11 * 15.96 ** 15.40 **
(4.00) (6.30) (7.60) (7.66)





Village/Time Fixed Effects N Y Y Y
Controls for Hh Composition
d NNYY
Observations 268 238 238 231
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Panel A includes household fixed effects, village-
crop-year fixed effects and controls for plot size (by decile), soil type, toposequence,
location and interactions with polygyny.
Data source: 1984-85 ICRISAT Burkina Faso Survey.
aCalculated as value of plot output per hectare.
bEstimated from specification presented in Panel A.
cDefined as share of total expenditure on agricultural inputs devoted to large capital
 goods (plows, scarifiers, weeders, ridgers, line tracers, seeders, sprayers, carts,
 tractors, draft animals).





Table 7. Fixed Effects Estimates of the Effect of
Cultivator Characteristcs on Plot Yield
a, by Household Structure
Polygynous Polygynous
=2 Wives >2 Wives Vertical
b Horizontal
c
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Gender (1=female) -155.14 *** -155.14 *** -8.43 -516.33 ***
(40.11) (39.01) (21.02) (111.29)
Other Male -56.35 -56.35 -18.55 -237.79 **
(47.21) (45.91) (25.80) (109.52)
Other Female -16.02 -16.02 -22.94 -5.00
(36.50) (35.49) (20.73) (74.17)
Gender*Polygynous 136.33 ** 154.32 *** -9.68 518.79 ***
(53.59) (53.01) (26.50) (117.88)
Other Male*Poly 72.42 45.40 8.06 251.77 **
(62.19) (62.09) (34.52) (116.05)
Other Female*Poly 14.76 13.91 20.62 2.30
(48.07) (44.86) (27.05) (78.45)
Observations 3112 3142 2878 1823
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All specifications include household-crop-year
fixed effects and controls for plot size (by decile), soil type, toposequence, location,
and interactions with polygyny. Data source: 1984-85 ICRISAT Burkina Faso Survey.
aCalculated as value of plot output per hectare.
bExcludes households that contain a brother of the household head.












Total Hh Plot Area 0.023 ***
(0.006)
Observations 231
First Stage Polygynous Total Area Polygynous Total Area
Dagari-Djula 0.707 *** 0.820 0.708 *** 0.841
(0.188) (1.175) (0.190) (1.172)
Bwa 0.201 4.138 *** 0.201 4.140 ***
(0.146) (0.912) (0.147) (0.909)
Other Ethnic Group 0.100 0.648 0.096 0.648
(0.193) (1.209) (0.195) (1.208)
Inherited Area 0.004 0.257 *** 0.004 0.260 ***
(0.008) (0.050) (0.008) (0.050)




Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. All specifications include controls for household composition.
Data source: 1984-85 ICRISAT Burkina Faso Survey.
aIncludes plows, scarifiers, weeders, ridgers, line tracers, seeders, sprayers, carts, tractors
and draft animals.
bPolygynyous and total household plot area treated as endogenous. Instruments include ethnic
group ("other" includes Rimaibe, Fulani/Peulh, Fulse/Kurumba, Mossi and Dafing/Marka;
"Southern" Fulani/Peulh Mossi is the excluded category) and hectares of inherited land.












   0.590**     0.592**
(III)
Fixed Effects
b
IV with Village*Year
0.24
(0.89) (0.87)
0.27